We investigate the Big 5 to Big 4 consolidation and its impact on audit market share equality. We extend the GAO's ͑2008͒ study on audit firm industry market concentration to examine whether the remaining Big N firms' market shares are more equal after the Big 4 consolidation. We also extend the GAO study to examine audit market shares at the city and city-industry levels. We find that while overall market concentration increases, the Big 4 have more equal market shares than the Big 5 had prior to the consolidation at all levels of analysis. The increase in market share equality may explain why there has been inconsistent evidence of an association between market concentration and competition after the consolidation ͑Feldman 2006; GAO 2008͒. However, we find that the largest four clients in each market we examine are more likely to share the same auditor after consolidation, which suggests the largest clients face constrained choices.
INTRODUCTION
W e investigate the Big 5 to the Big 4 consolidation ͑hereafter, Big 4 consolidation͒ and its impact on audit market share levels. The Big 4 consolidation resulted from Big 5 firm Arthur Andersen's demise in 2002. We compare the equality of the Big 5's market share prior to consolidation in 2001, to the Big 4's market shares after the audit market settled in 2007. We specifically focus on the equality of market shares among the Big N at the nationalindustry level, the city level, and the city-industry level.
We study how equally the Big N firms share clients before and after the Big 4 consolidation for three reasons. First, the United States Congress expressed specific concern about audit firm concentration. It directed the General Accounting Office ͑GAO͒ to study concentration levels and competition as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ͑SOX; GAO 2003 . The congressional mandate to study the audit market speaks to the importance of the topic to policy setters.
Second, the GAO ͑2003, 2008͒ studies only consider the impact of consolidation based on overall market concentration and do not examine whether consolidation impacts how equally divided market shares are among leading firms pre-and post-consolidation. We examine market equality based on evidence from industrial organization research that suggests equality of market shares among the largest suppliers, in addition to market concentration, can impact competition ͑e.g., Willis and Rogers 1998; Schmalensee 1989͒ . In addition, there is indirect evidence in the auditing literature that unequal market shares can impact competition. Mayhew and Wilkins ͑2003͒ show large market share differences between market leaders and the next largest firm lead to price premiums. Such differences in market shares are consistent with market inequality. Doogar and Easley ͑1998͒ also model that differences in market shares ͑i.e., equality͒ can inhibit the ability of small market share firms to compete for clients due to capacity constraints.
Third, we examine the Big 4 consolidation because it did not result from a merger like the prior consolidations and, therefore, the impact on market equality is less clear. The demise of Andersen led to significant competition for its clients ͑Kohlbeck et al. 2008͒ . 1 In contrast, the Big 8 consolidation to the Big 6 ͑hereafter, Big 6 consolidation͒ and the consolidation from the Big 6 to the Big 5 ͑hereafter, Big 5 consolidation͒ both resulted from mergers among the largest firms. Clients tend to stay with merged firms ͑Healy and Lys 1986͒. Andersen's demise also occurred contemporaneously with the passage of SOX. SOX strengthened auditors' independence rules and required internal control reviews that absorbed auditors' capacity. Both independence requirements and a decrease in available capacity could affect market equality. The competition for Andersen's clients and advent of SOX can lead to either industry leaders becoming more dominant; or it can lead to gains by industry laggards gaining relative market share. The former ͑latter͒ results in less ͑more͒ equal market shares.
We investigate how equally the Big N shares clients before and after the consolidation, using three different measures. Each measure provides its own evidence on the equality of market shares. First, we use the Gini measure of concentration, which explicitly measures market equality among suppliers and includes an adjustment for the number of the suppliers ͑Quick and Wolz 1999; Abidin et al. 2008͒ . Gini provides the purest measure of equality among the Big N firms. Second, we use the adjusted Herfindahl Index ͑ADJ_HI͒ developed by Minyard and Tabor ͑1991͒. It adjusts the Herfindahl Index for the expected market shares, based on equal sharing among the Big N audit firms. This measure is similar in purpose to the Gini measure, but it is less refined. Finally, we develop a new measure of auditor diversification among the largest four clients in each industry. Prior research suggests that the largest clients in many industries do not want to employ the same auditor due to concerns over client-sensitive data ͑Kwon 1996͒. This measure supplies evidence on how equally the industry's largest clients are divided among the Big N. We employ both descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis at each level of analysis. Descriptive analysis of industry-level data shows that firms with relatively low market shares ͑less than 15 percent͒ gain market share relative to firms with high market shares ͑greater than 25 percent͒. They appear to gain market share via Andersen's clients, Big 4 to Big 4 switchers, and non-Big 4 to Big 4 switchers. They also gain relatively more new clients. We find, using multivariate analysis, that market equality among the Big 4 firms increases at the industry, city, and city-industry levels following the Big 4 consolidation, based on the Gini and adjusted Herfindahl Index. However, we find an increase in commonality of auditors among the four largest clients at the industry and city-industry levels. Our results are consistent with increased sharing of small and medium-size clients among the Big 4. Our multivariate analysis also suggests that high-litigation industries have more equality of market shares than other industries. It appears that the Big 4 firms try to avoid becoming overly concentrated in high-litigation industries.
Our research makes three primary contributions. First, we extend the GAO's ͑2008͒ report by examining the impact of consolidations using multivariate controls for alternative explanations and examining changes in the equality of market shares. The GAO report provides univariate descriptive analysis of industries' market shares, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 2002 and 2006 ͑GAO 2008͒. We control for alternative explanations for observed market share increases, using a multivariate approach. We extend the GAO's findings to show that industry-level market equality increases, even after controlling for other factors. This is important because evidence from the industrial organization literature suggests that equality of market shares among the leading firms impacts competition ͑Willis and Rogers 1998͒.
Second, we examine the impact of consolidation on equality of city-level ͑and city-industry level͒ market shares to provide insight into the local effects of consolidation. Recent research has examined the city-level audit market competition and audit quality, suggesting that focusing only on the national-industry level may be incomplete ͑Francis et al. 2005; Kallapur et al. 2009͒ . We, again, find more equality in market shares at the city and city-industry levels following the Big 4 consolidation.
Third, we extend the analysis of market share changes to explore whether the increased concentration levels have constrained the largest clients from selecting different auditors than their largest competitors. This work expands on Kwon's ͑1996͒ observation that the largest clients in each industry typically seek different auditors. We provide evidence that the largest clients in each industry are more likely to have the same auditor after the consolidation. This suggests that the Big 4 consolidation limited the largest clients' choices.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide background information and related research on auditor concentration and the Big 4 consolidation event. We then develop our research design employed to evaluate the data. In the next two sections, we describe the sample and report our results. The final section provides our summary and conclusions.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the basis for our research. First, we discuss the concept of market equality from the industrial organization literature and how it relates to audit markets. Second, we provide an overview of the audit concentration research. Finally, we discuss the Big 4 consolidation and our specific research question.
Market Equality
The industrial organization literature uses market concentration levels to assess market structure and competition ͑Schmalensee 1989͒. Much of this research uses cumulative market shares of the largest firms in the industry as a measure of concentration. For example, Danos and Eichenseher ͑1986͒ and Hogan and Jeter ͑1999͒ use market concentration ratios based on the cumulative market shares of the largest four auditors in the industry to assess audit market concentrations. Market concentration ratios often mask underlying differences between industries, in terms of market share equality, across the market share leaders. For example, compare two hypothetical industries. Industry A's leaders have market shares of 60, 10, 5, and 5; and industry B's have market shares of 20, 20, 20, and 20 . Both industries have four-firm concentration ratios of 80, but we expect more competition in the latter industry.
Market share equality provides insight into the level of competition within industry or city markets, as well as the ability of clients to find unique auditors. Industrial organization research generally supports the conclusion that more-concentrated industries are less competitive ͑Schmal-ensee 1989͒. However, recent research on the Big 4 consolidation suggests the association between concentration and competition is less predictable ͑Feldman 2006; GAO 2008͒. Feldman ͑2006͒ finds audit fees increase more in industries that become more concentrated after the Big 4 consolidation. In contrast, the GAO ͑2008͒ finds only an economically insignificant increase in fees associated with concentrated industries. We believe the lack of consistent evidence is due to differences in the equality of market shares among the Big N. PepsiCo and Coca-Cola provide a classic example of two firms in a highly concentrated industry, but who have relatively equal market shares.
2 These two companies compete rigorously. Willis and Rogers ͑1998͒ provide additional evidence that market equality impacts competition. They find advertising intensity ͑ad-vertising expense/sales͒ is higher in food markets where the leading producers have less-dispersed ͑i.e., more equal͒ market shares suggesting that equality can lead to more competition.
Auditor Concentration
Danos and Eichenseher produced the first large-scale U.S. studies of auditor industry concentration ͑Eichenseher and Danos 1981; Eichenseher 1982, 1986͒ . They find that regulated industries are more concentrated than non-regulated industries ͑Eichenseher and Danos 1981͒; that the changes in the auditors' industry market shares depend on beginning overall market shares, industry market shares, and nature of the industry ͑Danos and Eichenseher 1982͒; and that growth firms and large clients drive increases in Big 8 market shares, and most of this growth occurs in regulated industries ͑Danos and Eichenseher 1986͒.
Hogan and Jeter ͑1999͒ update Danos and Eichenseher ͑1982͒ through the Big 6 mergers that formed Deloitte & Touche and Ernst & Young. They find evidence of significant increases in industry concentration levels in non-regulated industries, while regulated industries remain highly concentrated. They also provide evidence that the market leaders continue to increase their market shares, while Big 6 firms with small industry market shares lose market share over time. Doogar and Easley's model appears to explain the findings of Hogan and Jeter ͑1999͒. Doogar and Easley ͑1998͒ predict firms with smaller market shares will continue to have small market shares because they do not have the same productive capacity to serve new clients that large market share firms possess. Minyard and Tabor ͑1991͒ and Wootton et al. ͑1994͒ find overall concentration increased after the Big 6 consolidation. Francis et al. ͑1999͒ examine the effect of the Big 6 mergers at the national-industry, city, and city-industry level. They find that Ernst & Young increased market shares in cities where it had high pre-consolidation market shares, thereby becoming a market leader. Deloitte & Touche increased market shares, providing them more coverage of cities and industries, but generally did not become a market leader.
Big 4 Consolidation
The Big 4 consolidation raises concerns about the level of audit market competition ͑GAO 2003, 2008͒. The consolidation also corresponded to the creation of SOX and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ͑PCAOB͒ and the strengthening of independence rules that limit the services an audit firm can provide to an audit client. The consolidation and the change in independence rules reduce the number of auditors for clients to choose from-especially for larger companies that demand a large international audit firm. The Big 4 consolidation should increase concentration in the audit market, but the impact on market share equality is less clear.
Prior consolidations do not provide much insight into the Big 4 consolidation. In contrast to the Big 4 consolidation, the Big 6 and Big 5 consolidations resulted from mergers. Clients tend to follow their auditor to the newly merged firm ͑Healy and Lys 1986͒. However, Andersen's failure resulted in a less orderly client movement ͑Kohlbeck et al. 2008͒ . KPMG, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte & Touche each purchased some former Andersen offices; and all four remaining firms competed on the open market for clients.
The Big 4 consolidation can produce different equality of market share outcomes. A significant increase in industry-leader market shares generates less market equality. Industry leaders can gain market share because clients demand industry leaders for quality reasons ͑Craswell et al. 1995; Dunn and Mayhew 2004͒ . Industry leaders can also pursue clients to maintain market shares. And leaders may be the only firms with the production capacity to expand ͑Doogar and Easley 1998͒. SOX increased the reporting requirements to include internal controls, thereby increasing the audit effort required for each client. The increased reporting requirements reduced the ability of auditors to supply audits due to constrained resources. Doogar and Easley ͑1998͒ assert that firms with large market shares have more capacity to adjust to increased supply requirements than small market share firms, such that market leaders tend to remain so. This same idea applies at the industry level, where large industry market share firms are more likely to have the necessary expertise to expand within the industry than small industry market share firms. Conversely, the Big 4 consolidation provides the non-industry leaders opportunities to gain market shares relative to the leader͑s͒. For example, Francis et al. ͑1999͒ document the merger creating Deloitte & Touche in 1989, as an effort of non-leaders to increase coverage across the relevant audit markets. Non-leaders also gain when the industry-leading firms do not pursue additional clients to avoid potential scrutiny ͑e.g., political costs͒ or to diversify industry-specific risk. The GAO's concern over industry-level concentration adds credibility to the claim that firms face political costs in overly concentrated industries. As a result, audit firms with lower preconsolidation market shares gain relatively greater market shares. This result produces more equally balanced industry market shares among the remaining large audit firms.
SOX also limits the ability of audit clients to purchase nonaudit services from their auditor. If clients value the nonaudit services greater than the audit services, auditor-concentration ratios can change as clients obtain new auditors. Conversely, SOX may not affect auditor-concentration ratios as audit leaders maintain their audit-specialization investment and forgo conflicting nonaudit fees.
the remaining firms using the same metric we employ. Ballas and Fafaliou ͑2008͒ find national concentration metrics increase in most of the EU as well as in broad industry sectors.
The Big 4 consolidation research to date shows clear evidence that overall concentration levels have increased, but provides limited insight into whether market shares are more or less equal after consolidation. In addition, there is little or no research examining the impact of consolidation at the city or city-industry level.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In this section, we describe three measures of equality and the empirical methods we use to examine auditor industry market equality. Each metric measures a different aspect of audit market equality.
First, we consider the Gini measure of the Big N market shares at the industry level. The Gini measure provides a measure of market share equality based on the Lorenz curve. A Lorenz curve graphs the cumulative market share from the smallest market share to the largest market share in an industry. The Gini measure effectively compares the curve to the 45-degree angle representing equal market shares. We adopt the measure used by Abidin et al. ͑2008͒ and Quick and Wolz ͑1999͒:
where n equals the number of Big N auditors in industry k and time t; X k,t equals the mean market share based on the audit fees for the Big N auditors within industry k, at time t; and X k,t,i equals the industry market share k, at time t, of Big N audit firm i based on the audit fees. The Gini measure is calculated for each industry, with the Big N auditors ordered from smallest to largest in terms of market share rank within each industry.
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Close inspection of the Gini measure shows that as market equality decreases Gini increases. Market shares are ranked from smallest to largest. The smaller market shares below the median count as negative numbers; and larger market shares count as positive numbers in the summation. When market shares are relatively equal, the summation will be close to zero, and when they are unequal they will approach 100. This increase results from the larger market share firms creating relatively large positive numbers that exceed the much smaller negative numbers in the summation. It also adjusts for number of supply firms, which enables us to compare pre-and postconsolidation Gini scores.
We employ a second equality measure based on the adjusted Herfindahl Index ͑ADJ_HI͒ proposed by Minyard and Tabor ͑1991͒. The Herfindahl Index measures the level of competition within an industry or market. However, it is sensitive to the number of audit firms; in that, it will almost always increase if the number of firms decreases. The ADJ_HI is the difference between the Herfindahl Index and the base level ͑expected market share based on the number of Big N audit firms͒. While this measure does not specifically measure equality of market shares, it enables us to use the more widely accepted Herfindahl Index and compare it for the pre-and post-events. The ADJ_HI is calculated as follows ͑Minyard and Tabor 1991͒:
where n equals the number of Big N auditors in industry k; and X equals the industry market share of Big N audit firm i. Both the Gini and ADJ_HI metrics measure the equality of market shares that are less susceptible to changes in the number of suppliers, but do not assess the optimality of market shares. Audit firms can potentially provide higher-quality audits by investing heavily in an industry and auditing a significant portion of an industry, thereby enhancing their industry-specific expertise. Greater concentration by one auditor leads to more unequal market shares.
Our final measure differs in nature from the first two measures. It enables us to evaluate auditor concentration among the largest clients in the industry. Kwon ͑1996͒ argues large clients often have concerns about information transfer that could result from hiring an auditor who also services its main competitors. A notable example resulted when Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young merged in 1989 to form Ernst & Young. This merger resulted in Coca-Cola and PepsiCo having the same auditor. Immediately following the merger, PepsiCo hired a new auditor ͑Kwon 1996͒.
We develop a measure based on the commonality of auditors among the largest four clients in each industry. COMMON4 takes on one of the following four values: 1 ͑each of the four companies use a different auditor͒, 2 ͑the four companies use three different auditors͒, 3 ͑the four companies use two different auditors͒, and 4 ͑each of the four companies use the same auditor͒. Greater values indicate a higher level of commonality among the four largest companies in the industry. The largest four clients represent 35 percent of 2001 industry assets, on average. These large clients typically are the most concerned about information transfer to competitors. Based on the desire for limited information transfer, we would not expect a change in COMMON4 after the consolidation. However, the largest clients also require the most auditor resources and more specialized staff that can result in production constraints on auditors with smaller market shares ͑Doogar and Easley 1998͒. In such cases, we would expect large clients to share the same auditor. We are not able to adjust the COMMON4 measure for the change in the number of Big N auditors. However, we intentionally selected the top four clients so that it was possible for each of the four clients to have a separate auditor both pre-and post-consolidation.
More ͑less͒ equality of market shares among the Big 4 auditors following the Big 4 consolidation is consistent with lower ͑greater͒ measures for Gini, ADJ_HI, and COMMON4. We run simulations to assess how objectively these metrics measure equality based on the consolidation from the Big 5 to Big 4. We evaluate two basic scenarios. First, we assume Andersen's clients are allocated pro rata, based on the remaining firms' 2001 market shares within each industry. Under such conditions, the industry leader obtains more clients than the industry laggards. This allocation should not result in more equality. Our simulations show, essentially, zero change in the Gini and ADJ_HI metric. Of course, any more extreme allocation favoring the industry leaders, results in less industry equality. Second, we simulate the case where the remaining firms share Andersen's clients equally. In this case, the leading firm and lagging firms all get the same share of clients. This case leads to more equality, as the small market share firms will gain relatively more clients than the leading firms. As expected, we see an increase in the Gini and ADJ_HI metrics under such assumptions. Again, any allocation that results in more than an equal share going to the small market share firms also results in more equality. Our simulations provide comfort that these metrics capture the equality of market shares, regardless of the number of suppliers in this setting.
We develop a multivariate model to investigate changes in these three market share equality measures. We draw on prior research of changes in industry auditor concentration ͑Hogan and Jeter 1999͒ to develop an empirical model. We use the same empirical model for each measure, because this set of independent variables captures the industry and city characteristics that are likely to impact each measure. We estimate the following equation using industry-year observations for each of our measures of audit market share equality:
where Market Share Equality takes on the value of Gini, ADJ_HI, or COMMON4, as defined above.
Hogan and Jeter ͑1999͒ model industry auditor concentration as a function of industry characteristics including client concentration in the industry, industry size, regulation, and litigation risk.
5 CCR4 is the four-firm client concentration ratio for each industry, calculated as the ratio of the sales of the four largest clients in the industry to total industry sales. Greater client concentration results in a lower level of equality. Auditors cannot audit a portion of a client, so when a few clients dominate an industry, so will a few auditors. SIZE is the natural log of the mean asset size of the clients included in industry k. We include average client size because the larger the average client, the more likely the industry is to be equally shared. This view is essentially the corollary to the client concentration ratio. REG is an indicator variable if the client is in regulated industries ͑utilities, banking, insurance, and trading industries, based on Fama and French's ͓1997͔ 49 industry classifications͒ and 0 otherwise. Economies of scale associated with auditing firms in regulated industries also lead to higher inequality. Finally, LIT is an indicator variable for clients in litigious industries ͑medical equipment, pharmaceutical products, chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, business services, computer hardware, electronic equipment, and measuring and control equipment industries, based on Fama and French's ͓1997͔49 industry classifications͒. We expect more equality for higher litigation risk industries, consistent with auditor risk aversion. However, auditors may seek greater market share to increase expertise and reduce audit risk as a way to limit litigation risk. Greater individual firm market share increases inequality across auditors. BIG4 equals 1 after the Big 4 consolidation. 6 This variable captures the Big4 consolidation event from Big 5 to Big 4.
SAMPLE
Our sample consists of observations from 2001 and 2007 to provide data immediately prior to Andersen's demise-and passage of SOX and a more recent year sufficiently distant from the event-that should reflect equilibrium. We include all annual firm observations from the cross section of Audit Analytics and Compustat from these two years with available financial, auditor, and industry data. Our final sample consists of 47 industry observations from each year where industries are based on Fama and French ͑1997͒49 industry classifications. 7 We limit our main analysis to Big N auditors for two reasons. First, we want to compare results to the prior research that also focuses on the Big N auditors. Second, the level of competition among the largest auditors is the primary concern of the GAO and Congress ͑GAO 2003, 2008͒. We also provide supplementary analysis that incorporates the non-Big N to provide some insight into the impact on the overall audit market.
In Table 1 , we provide an analysis of auditors' industry market shares changes from 2001 to 2007, organized by the auditor's 2001 rank within the industry.
8 The summary statistics show that the smaller auditors in the market ͑2001 rank ϭ 3, 4, and 5͒ appear to have gained the most at the expense of the industry leaders. The third ͑fourth͒ ranked auditor reported increases in 80 percent 5 Hogan and Jeter ͑1999͒ also include a growth variable, a trend variable as a main effect, and the trend variable interacted with regulatory industries to investigate changes in industry auditor concentration overall and conditional on the regulatory nature of the industry. We exclude these because of the reduced time frame being investigated. 6 Each variable is remeasured at the city level and city-industry level, as appropriate, for these additional analyses. 7 Our analysis is based on Fama and French's ͑1997͒49 industry code classifications. Excluded from our analysis are two industries. We exclude group 45, as auditor codes are not available on Compustat for banks in 2001, and group 49, which has minimal observations. 8 Andersen is excluded from this analysis to better understand the effect on the remaining Big N auditors. 
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͑82 percent͒ of the industries with a weighted average increase of 13 percent ͑10 percent͒. The fifth ranked auditor had similar increases ͑93 percent of the industries increase with a weighted average of 11 percent͒. In contrast, the industry leader ͑rank ϭ 1͒ increased market share in only 39 percent of the industries and had a weighted average decrease in market share of 5 percent.
9 Table 2 The auditors with less than 15 percent ͑15 percent to 25 percent͒ group increased their market share by 8 percent ͑4 percent͒. The evidence is consistent with auditors in the less than 15 percent group gaining market share from relatively greater fee growth from existing clients, gaining more Andersen clients, and capturing relatively more Big 4 switchers and new listings than auditors in the other groups. This descriptive summary suggests a more equal sharing of clients after the Big 4 consolidation.
ANALYSIS
Our analysis consists of three distinct approaches to investigating changes in market share equality. First, we consider industry market share equality on a national basis. Second, we investigate market share equality on a city basis. Finally, we investigate city-industry market share equality. We then discuss sensitivity tests.
Industry Market Share Equality on a National Level
In Table 3, Table 4 , Panel A reports 2001 and 2007 descriptive statistics for our market share equality measures and the independent variables of the multivariate regression. The mean and median Gini measure, and the mean ADJ_HI measure decrease significantly, consistent with increased equality. In contrast, the median Herfindahl Index increased slightly, consistent with the GAO's ͑2008͒ assertion that market concentration increased. This univariate evidence is consistent with increased overall concentration; at the same time, there is an overall increase in market share equality across Big N audit firms.
The number of industries where the largest four clients all have different auditors decreases from 20 to 15. All of the decrease flows to industries where two auditors audit the four largest clients. This change in distribution results in a statistically significant increase in the median COMMON4-despite the fact it is 2 in both years. The independent variables, with the exception of SIZE, are not different. SIZE increases in 2007, suggesting that the average 2007 firm is larger.
We calculate but do not present Pearson and Spearman correlations for the dependent and independent variables in Equation ͑3͒. Gini and ADJ_HI are highly correlated ͑0.988͒, but are much less correlated with COMMON4 ͑0.103͒. In addition, the CCR4 ratio is highly correlated with Gini and ADJ_HI. We expect this correlation, as the size of the largest clients in an industry directly affects the level of auditor industry market share equality. LIT is negatively correlated with the equality measures, suggesting more equality among high-litigation industries. Table 4 , Panel B documents our Equation ͑3͒ estimate using ordinary least squares ͑ordered 9 Similar results are obtained when we determine market share using the square root of total assets audited. multinomial Logit͒ with Gini and ADJ_HI ͑COMMON4͒ as our market share equality measure.
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The Gini and ADJ_HI models generate adjusted R 2 s of 61 percent and 53 percent, respectively. The COMMON4 model has a Pseudo R 2 of approximately 11 percent. The BIG4 coefficient is significantly negative in the Gini and ADJ_HI models. Both imply an increase in equality following the Big 4 consolidation.
11 CCR4 is positive and significant in both models, consistent with expectations that industries with relatively large clients will tend to have less equal auditor market shares. REG is marginally significant in the Gini model, implying less equal market share in regulated industries.
The COMMON4 model shows a positive and significant BIG4 coefficient, suggesting that the frequency that the largest four companies in the industry employ the same auditor͑s͒ increases. Both SIZE and LIT are negative in the COMMON4 estimation. The LIT variable indicates that auditors are less concentrated among the four largest clients in high litigation risk industries.
Market Share Equality on a City Level
We identify 88 city markets across the United States where Big N firms have offices. All measures of market share equality and relevant independent variables are recalculated at the city level. We delete five city markets that do not have Big 4 auditors in 2007. Our final sample of 83 city markets is similar to the 77 used in Francis et al. ͑2005͒. Sixty-three of the 83 cities experience a decrease in Gini. Weighted-average Gini across cities also shows a decline from approximately 40 to 30 from 2001 to 2007. Table 5 , Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the market share equality measures and the independent variables. The Gini measure decreases between 2001 and 2007, consistent with increased equality among the Big 4 auditors. However, there are no differences in the other market share equality metrics. The average SIZE also increases. Table 5 , Panel B documents our multivariate regressions at the city level. We delete the two indicator variables, REG and LIT, from Equation ͑3͒, as these two variables are not well defined Gini measures equality of industry market shares across the Big N auditors based on audit fees for each client. *, **, *** Estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, based on one-tailed tests for directional prediction, and two-tailed tests otherwise.
Gini and ADJ_HI models are estimated using OLS; and the COMMON4 model is estimated using an ordered multinomial Logit.
(continued on next page)
Variable Definitions: Market Share Equality ϭ the value of Gini, ADJ_HI, or COMMON4; Gini ϭ the measure of Big N auditor equality within each industry calculated in Equation ͑1͒ using audit fees; HI ϭ the Herfindahl Index, calculated as the sum of squares of the auditor market shares based on audit fees; ADJ_HI ϭ the adjusted Herfindahl Index and is calculated as the difference between the HI and the expected market shares based on the number of Big N auditors; COMMON4 ϭ an indicator variable that takes one of the following four values: 1 ͑each of the four companies use a different auditor͒, 2 ͑the four companies use three different auditors͒, 3 ͑the four companies use two different auditors͒, and 4 ͑each of the four companies use the same auditor͒; CCR4 ϭ the four-firm client concentration ratio for each industry calculated as the ratio of the sum of the square root of assets of the four largest clients in the industry to the total for the industry; SIZE ϭ the natural log of the mean asset size of the clients included in industry k;
LIT ϭ an indicator variable for clients in litigious industries ͑medical equipment, pharmaceutical products, chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, business services, computer hardware, electronic equipment, and measuring and control equipment industries based on Fama and *, **, *** Estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, based on one-tailed tests for directional prediction, and two-tailed tests otherwise.
at the city level. 12 The models are well specified with the explanatory power ranging from 19 percent to 73 percent. CCR4 ratio is positively related to each of the measures, as expected. The BIG4 coefficient suggests a significantly lower Gini measure post-Big 4 consolidation. However, we find no significant results regarding changes in ADJ_HI or COMMON4 in 2007.
We expanded our analysis at the city level in untabled results. First, we create a variable representing the number of Big 4 audit firms in each city ͑#BIG4͒. The variable itself is negative and significant when added to the Gini and ADJ_HI city models. That is, the number of Big 4 auditors in a city increases market share equality. #BIG4 does not affect the Gini estimation, but it produces a significantly negative BIG4 coefficient in the ADJ_HI estimation that was insignificant otherwise. The BIG4 coefficient remains insignificant in the COMMON4 model with the addition of #BIG4. This result is essentially mechanical due to the way we construct COMMON4 and its high correlation with #BIG4. We also reestimate our models, excluding 15 city-level observations where only one Big N firm is present. The results strengthen.
Second, we created a variable measuring the number of clients in each city, and include its log ͑LN#CLIENTS͒ in the city-level models. LN#CLIENTS is negative and significant in all three city-level models. The more clients in the city, the equality of Big 4 market shares is greater. The significance of BIG4 does not change in the Gini model, but again becomes negative and significant in the ADJ_HI model. Again, LN#CLIENTS has no impact on BIG4 in the COMMON4 model.
Market Share Equality on a City-Industry Level
We combine the industry-level and city-level analyses to create 649 city-industry observations. A full cross of city and industry is not possible. Many industries are not represented in each Big 4 location in both 2001 and 2007. We recalculate all measures of market share equality and relevant independent variables based on the city-industry level.
In Table 6 , Panel A, we report descriptive statistics. The univariate analysis shows that both the Gini and ADJ_HI are significantly less in 2007 compared to 2001, consistent with an increase in equality. However, there is no difference in COMMON4. Table 6 , Panel B, reports our multivariate regression estimations. We again drop REG from Equation ͑3͒. 13 We include LIT to capture industries with high litigation. The models' explanatory power ranges from 7 percent to 32 percent. As expected, CCR4 ͑SIZE͒ is positively ͑negatively͒ related to each of the market share equality measures. We also find that LIT is negatively related to each measure, consistent with more equality in high-risk industries and with auditors' risk aversion. Our city-industry level results are comparable to our industry-level and city-level results. We find a significantly lower Gini and ADJ_HI in 2007. We document an increase in COMMON4.
Similar to the city analysis, when we add #BIG4 to the city-industry models, it is negative and significant, but does not change the significance of the BIG4 coefficient for the Gini, ADJ_HI, or COMMON4 models. When we add LN#CLIENTS to the city-industry models, it is negative and significant in all three models and has no impact on the significance or sign of the BIG4 coefficient for the Gini and ADJ_HI models, but BIG4 becomes insignificant in the COMMON4 model.
Comparison to Big 5 Consolidation
Our literature review reveals no studies on the Big 5 consolidation resulting from the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand ͑hereafter, PwC͒. This event provides a contrast to 12 As an alternative, we include the percentage of clients at the city level that are in regulated industries or litigious industries as explanatory variables. Our inferences are not affected. 13 We find only four city industries with more than one observation coded 1 for REG. This does not generate enough variation to include it in the model. We note that at the city level, regulated industries typically have very few firms. For example, few cities have more than one utility company. Of course, this is part of the reason the industry is regulated. *, **, *** Estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, based on one-tailed tests for directional prediction, and two-tailed tests otherwise.
(continued on next page)
The Impact of the Big 4 Consolidation on Audit Market Share Equality
Andersen's failure to assess how a merger impacts market equality. We examine the Big 5 consolidation using the same models we use in Table 4 ; except we use the square root of client assets to calculate Gini and ADJ_HI for the Big 5 consolidation because audit fee data was not publically disclosed at that time. 14 We compare 1997, the last year prior to PwC's merger, and 2001, the last year prior to the Andersen's collapse. This window is the largest space between the pre-and post-merger allocation and maximizes the chance of market equilibrium after the Big 5 consolidation.
In untabled results, we find the Big 5 consolidation does not result in a significant change in equality of market shares under any of the measures we employ at the industry level of analysis. In contrast, when we look at industry concentration measured by the Herfindahl Index, we find a significant increase in concentration levels during the Big 5 ͑p Ͻ .01͒ and Big 4 consolidations ͑p ϭ .08͒. 15 This analysis suggests that the Big 5 consolidation resulting from the merger of two national firms did not increase equality among the leading firms and is fundamentally different from the Big 4 consolidation.
Sensitivity Analysis
We report the results of a number of sensitivity tests in the following paragraphs. Prior research uses the square root of clients' assets and the square root of revenues, rather than audit fees, in the determination of auditor concentration ͑Danos and Eichenseher 1982; Hogan and Jeter 1999͒. Our results are generally consistent with those reported when we consider these alternative measures for market share equality.
SOX became law at the same time that the Big 4 consolidation occurred. SOX specifically banned a number of nonaudit services. Audit firms providing these services had to choose whether to continue providing nonaudit services and resign the audit, or whether to retain the audit and discontinue providing services. We investigate whether there is a systematic association between the level of nonaudit fees provided to an industry in 2001 and the equality of industry market shares in 2007. We first calculate the 2001 ratio of nonaudit fees to audit fees for each industry. We then use cutoffs of that ratio to form indicator variables based on the median ratio and separately for the top quarter of nonaudit fee ratio industries. The nonaudit fee variables are not significant, nor do their inclusions change the significance of the BIG4 coefficient in any of our industry-level models. We also interact the nonaudit fee ratio variables with BIG4 to assess the differential impact of observations with high 2001 nonaudit fee ratios on 2007 market shares. Again, the interactions are not significant; and the basic results do not change. We do not observe any impact on our previously reported results at the city and city-industry level when we include similar nonaudit fee ratio variables.
We explore the impact of the non-Big N as well. First, the Big N's share of audit fees decreases from 96 percent to 91 percent from 2001 to 2007. The Big N's share of clients changes from 86 percent to 68 percent for clients in our initial data set in both 2001 and 2007. Combined, these changes suggest that the non-Big 4 gained a significant number of smaller clients. To examine the impact on market equality, we remeasure our dependent variables treating all the non-Big N as a single firm, and then reestimate the model in Table 4 . We take this approach rather than estimate market shares for literally hundreds of small audit firms, as it captures the essence of whether these firms, as a group, capture more market share and, thus, a more equal portion of the market. We find even stronger results than those presented in Table 5 , in terms of coefficient size 14 As discussed in our sensitivity analyses, we still find increasing equality after the Big 4 consolidation, using measures based on the square root of client assets. 15 We do not attempt to examine the Big 5 consolidation at the city level as we do not have adequate information to group cities in 1997.
and lower p-values. Not surprisingly, we do not see a similar impact on COMMON4, which continues to be positive, suggesting large clients have less choice. Hogan and Jeter ͑1999͒ include industry growth in their model, analyzing changes in auditorconcentration ratios. When we include their measure of growth, it is not significant and our inferences are not affected. We also consider interactions between the BIG4 variable and REG or LIT, and find that neither are significant.
Finally, we adjust the composition of the various markets. For our industry analyses, we exclude industries with fewer than ten firms, Big N market shares less than 90 percent ͑greater influence of non-Big N auditors͒, and client concentration ratios in the first and tenth deciles. We perform the same analyses for city markets. Overall, our results weaken as our sample sizes and power of our tests are reduced, but our results remain consistent with those reported.
CONCLUSION
We investigate the Big 4 consolidation's impact on auditor market share equality. Increased auditor concentration is almost a given; how any increase is shared among the Big N is unclear. We find that changes in both the Gini measure of market equality and the adjusted Herfindahl Index from 2001 to 2007 indicate increased equality among the remaining Big 4 auditors at both the national-industry level and city-industry level. The Gini measure suggests more equality at the city level. We also investigate the commonality of the auditors of the largest four companies in each market. We document an increase in the commonality of auditors of the largest four companies over this time period at both the industry and city-industry level. Combined, we show that the increased market equality is being driven by market dynamics outside of the largest four clients in each market.
The increase in market share equality potentially can explain why other studies have found little impact of the Big 4 consolidation on competition, despite an overall increase in auditor concentration ͑Feldman 2006; GAO 2008͒. Future research can evaluate whether equality of market shares, as measured in this paper, is associated with differences in competition, audit quality, and audit fees at the industry, city, and city-industry levels.
